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NOTES

The Equator Principles: The Private
Financial
Sector's
Attempt
at
Environmental Responsibility
ABSTRACT

The Equator Principles are a set of voluntary
environmental guidelines created to manage environmental
degradationthat results from large-scaledevelopmental projects
in the Third World. On June 4, 2003, ten private financial
institutions adopted these guidelines, and by the end of 2006
this number had grown to forty. Moreover, in June 2006 the
Principles were revised, raising the level of scrutiny for
companies that adhere to these guidelines.
At first blush, the adoption of the Equator Principles by
private financial institutions appears to be a substantial step
toward implementing environmental standards in developing
countries that lack adequate regulations. However, three years
after their inception, debate as to whether the Principles are
actually spurring environmental change remains. This Note
analyzes whether the Equator Principles are having a positive
impact and achieving their stated goals related to the local
environment in developing countries. This Note concludes that,
despite a great deal of uncertainty regarding their real impact,
the Equator Principles clearly have improved the situation by
placing the private sector in a proactive environmental role and
strengthening the public's ability to hold the financial sector
accountable for its actions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Hydroelectric dams, power plants, and other large-scale
developmental projects can substantially improve local economies;
however, these projects frequently come at a great cost to the
2
environment.1 In most cases, governments of the developing world
have failed to establish environmental regulations to prevent the
3
degradation of the local environment from these large-scale projects.
This lack of governmental regulation has allowed private institutions
to set their own bar for the environmental standards in the
developing world. Initially, project standards set by these private
institutions were minimal and resulted in large environmental
degradation. 4
However, as private funding for these projects

1.
See Robert F. Lawrence & William L. Thomas, The Equator Principlesand
Project Finance: Sustainability in Practice, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 20 (2004)
(discussing the environmental and social impact of project financings and the equator
principles).
2.
"Developing country" refers to "[a] country that is not as economically or
politically advanced as the main industrial powers. Developing countries are located
mostly in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin and South
America." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (8th ed. 2004).
3.
See Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 21-22.
4.
Id. at 22.
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increased, public criticism intensified, and private financial
institutions were targeted for their role in contributing to the
environmental degradation. 5
As a result of the increased public backlash, ten private financial
institutions adopted a set of.environmental guidelines known as the
Equator Principles on June 4, 2003.6 These private institutions,
known collectively as the Equator Principles Financial Institutions
(EPFIs), created the Equator Principles to "manag[e] social and
environmental issues related to the financing of projects. ' 7 By their
third anniversary, the Equator Principles had been adopted by forty
financial institutions including banks, export credit agencies, and
development finance institutions.8 These financial institutions control
approximately 80% of all project lending world-wide. 9 Although the
ability of the EPFIs to enforce these Principles is limited to the
contractual relationship of a specific project, their influence over the
industry grows as more banks adopt the Equator Principles.' 0 In
turn, this creates the possibility for the Principles to become the
international standard for all large-scale developmental projects."
It is tempting to think of the Equator Principles as a substantial
step toward enhancing environmental regulations in countries
However, three years after the
without adequate standards.
inception of the Equator Principles, public criticism of them remains.

5.

Id.

6.

MICHELLE

CHAN-FISHEL,

THE

UNPROVEN

PRINCIPLES:

THE

EQUATOR

PRINCIPLES AT YEAR Two 1 (2005), available at http://www.banktrack.org/doc/File/
BankTrack%20publications/BankTrack%20publications/050606%2OUnproven%2OPrinc
iples,the%20Equator%2OPrinciples%20at%20year%20two.pdf.

7.

Id.

8.
The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions, Institutions Which
Principles
(Sidebar),
http://www.equatorHave
Adopted
the
Equator
principles.com/faq.shtml (last visited Dec. 21, 2006). The following is a list of the
EPFIs as of Dec. 21, 2006: ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., ANZ, Banco Bradesco, Banco do
Brasil, Banco Itafi, Banca Intesa, Bank of America, BMO Financial Group, BTMU,
Barclays plc, BBVA, BES Group, Calyon, Caja Navarra, CIBC, Citigroup Inc., Credit
Suisse Group, Dexia Group, Dresdner Bank, E+CO, EKF, FMO, Fortis, HBOS, HSBC
Group, HypoVereinsbank, ING Group, JPMorgan Chase, KBC, Manulife, Mizuho
Corporate Bank, Millennium bcp, Nedbank Group, Rabobank Group, Royal Bank of
Canada, Sanpaolo IMI, Scotiabank, Standard Chartered Bank, SMBC, The Royal Bank
of Scotland, Unibanco, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, WestLB AG, Westpac Banking
Corporation. Id.
Rachael Bailey, Tracey Ryan & Nicky Hodges, Building on Sustainability
9.
into Syndication, ENVT'L. FIN., July-Aug. 2006, at 28.
10.
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilitiesfor Corporatio/rsat InternationalLaw, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
931, 983 (2004) ("[A]dequate protection of the environment is essential to human wellbeing and the enjoyment of basic human rights.").
11.
Id.
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In July 2006, the EPFIs launched the Equator Principles 1112 (EPII)
to address many of these criticisms. 13 Currently, thirty-three of the
forty original EPFIs have adopted the EPII. 14 Because the EPII are
new to the marketplace, little information exists regarding their
However, an analysis of the revisions to the Equator
impact.
Principles and how these changes were made is important to
understanding the effect of the Principles on the private sector.
This Note analyzes whether the Equator Principles have
positively impacted the environment in the developing world and
achieved their stated goals of managing social and environmental
risk. Part II of this Note outlines the requirements of the Equator
Principles. Part III discusses the events leading up to the formation
of the Principles. Part IV sets forth the common criticism of the
Principles. In Part V, this Note considers the incentives private
financial institutions have for adopting and adhering to the Equator
Principles. Part VI then presents a case study, analyzing the effects
of the Equator Principles on Sakhalin II, an integrated oil and gas
development project in Russia. In order to determine the impact and
future of the Principles on bank activities, Part VII examines each of
the following: (1) whether an EPFI can be held liable for violating the
Equator Principles, (2) the impact of the Equator Principles on the
banking industry and the environment, and (3) the amendments to
the Equator Principles and reasons for theses changes. Finally, Part
VIII concludes by arguing that despite a great deal of uncertainty
surrounding the Equator Principles, they have improved
environmental performance by placing the private sector in a
proactive environmental role and by increasing the public's ability to
hold the financial sector accountable for its actions.

II.

THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

The stated purpose of the Equator Principles is to "ensure that
the projects [the EPFIs] finance are developed in a manner that is
socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management
practices."'1 5 The Principles apply to all financial projects with a total

The Equator Principles, The "Equator Principles": A Financial Industry
12.
Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing Social & Environmental Risk in
Project Finance, July 2006, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/
Equator_-Principles.pdf [hereinafter Equator Principles].
Demetri Sevastopulo, Revisions Raise Social Hurdles Changes To The
13.
Equator Principles:Banks That Sign Up To The New And Tighter Guidelines Will Be
Gaining Flexibility,FIN. TIMES REP., June 12, 2006, at 1.
Revised Equator Principles,IM INT'L MINING, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.im14.

mining.comlArticles/RevisedEquatorPrinciples.asp.
Equator Principles, supra note 12, pmbl.
15.
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capital cost of at least $50 million. 16 These projects are initially
categorized for their level of environmental and social risks based on
internal guidelines that are derived from screening criteria used by
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm
of the World Bank. 17 Specifically, the project's risks are assessed
depending on the "type, location, sensitivity, and scale of the project
and the nature and magnitude of its potential environmental and
'8
social impacts.'
Based on the level of environmental and social risk, each project
is placed into either Category A, Category B, or Category C,
correlating with high, medium, and low levels of risk. 19 Category A
projects are "likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts
that are sensitive, diverse or unprecedented. '20 The risks to the
natural habitat or cultural heritage sites of Category A projects are
21
potentially irreversible and may extend beyond the project site.
Category B projects pose potentially adverse environmental impacts
on human populations or on important areas, such as grasslands,
forests, wetlands, and natural habitats. 22 In contrast to the potential
impacts of Category A projects, the potentially adverse impacts of
Category B projects are site specific, often can be mitigated, and
rarely are irreversible.2 3 Finally, Category C projects are likely to
24
have minimal or no adverse impact on the environment.
Both Category A and B projects require the company proposing
25
the project to compile an Environmental Assessment (EA).
Although an EA for Category B projects contains the same essential
elements as those required for Category A projects, Category B
analyses typically are narrower in scope. 26 Projects that fall into
27
Category C do not require an EA.
The EA must include an examination of both the negative and
positive potential environmental impacts. 28 The company is also

16.
Id.
9.
17.
Id.
1. See also Andreas Missbach, Remarks Before the Public Eye on
Davos Conference: The Equator Principles: Opportunities and Shortcomings (Jan. 23,
2004) (transcript available at http:/lwww.evb.ch/index.cfm?pageid=2773) ("The
Equator Principles are based on the policies and guidelines of the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank.").
18.
Equator Principles, supra note 12, Exhibit I.
19.
Missbach, supra note 17.
20.
Equator Principles, supra note 12, Exhibit I.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. 2.
26.
Id., Exhibit I.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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required to compare the potential impacts with feasible alternatives,
29
including a scenario where the project is not implemented at all.
Finally, the EA includes recommendations for potential minimization,
30
prevention, mitigation, or compensation measures.
The EA must also address the project's compliance with the laws
of the host country. 3 1 The EA will indicate the minimum applicable
standards under the Pollution Prevention and Abatement Guidelines
of the World Bank and the IFC. 32 If the host country is a low or
middle income country, 33 the EA must take into account the
applicable IFC Safeguard Policies. 34 Finally, the EA should be
consistent with the categorization procedures, as well as address the
key environmental and social issues identified in the categorization
35
process.
Based on the conclusions of the EA, the borrower or a third-party
expert for all Category A projects and certain Category B projects
must develop an Environmental Management Plan (EMP). 36 The
EMP addresses any "mitigation, action plans, monitoring,
management of risk and schedules" for the project. 37 The borrower
then covenants to: (1) obey the EMP throughout the project's
construction and operation, (2) regularly report the borrower's
compliance with the EMP, and (3) decommission the facility in
38
accordance with an agreed upon Decommissioning Plan as needed.
The Equator Principles also require a borrower or third-party
expert for all Category A projects and certain Category B projects to
consult with potentially impacted groups. 39 Accordingly, the EA must
be translated into the language of the host country for public
comment. 40 Typically the potentially impacted groups are comprised
of the indigenous population and local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). 41 Both the EA and the EMP must address the
42
comments made by these parties.

29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. 13.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. Low and middle income countries are defined by the standards used by
the World Bank and are listed on the World Bank Indicator Database:
www.worldbank.org/datat/countryclass/classgroups.htm. Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. 2.
36.
Id. 4.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
6.
39.
Id.
5.
40.
Id.
41.
See id.
42.

Id.
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The EPFIs are responsible for determining whether the borrower
is in compliance with the Equator Principles. 4 3 If necessary, the
banks are able to appoint an independent expert to provide additional
review and reporting services. 44 If a borrower is found to be in
violation of the Equator Principles, the lender can seek a proposed
45
solution from the borrower to bring the project into compliance.
However, adoption of the Equator Principles is voluntary, and the
internal policies banks establish are independent of the IFC and the
World Bank. 4 6 Therefore, adoption of the Equator Principles does
"not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or
' 47
private.

III.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR PRIVATE ACTION

A. Introduction
Traditionally, private entities are viewed as reactionary to
governmental regulations. 48
However, this reactionary stance is
evolving, and private institutions are beginning to take an
increasingly proactive role by self-regulating. 49
The Equator
Principles represent this proactive stance in the area of
environmental regulation and are a major change in the private
50
sector's traditional role.
EPFIs adopt the Principles by pledging to provide direct funding
only to those projects that comply with their requirements. 51 The
decision to adhere to the Equator Principles is voluntary, and EPFIs
do not sign a formal agreement. 52 Generally, an EPFI adheres to the
Principles by including additional environmental requirements in its

43.

Id., pmbl.

44.

Id.

7.

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

8.
9.

47.

Id.

48.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM L.
REV. 2029, 2037 (2005).
49.
Id.
50.
See id. ('The private governance scholarship has focused on two principle
areas: (1) the privatization of public services . . .; and (2) the extent to which
government agencies contract with private actors to establish or enforce regulatory
standards.").
51.
Equator Principles, supra note 12, pmbl.
52.
Pratap Ravindran, Equator Principles. Why Indian Banks Too Should Be
Guided By Them, THE HINDU, July 25, 2003, available at http://www.equatorPrinciples.com/hindu1.shtml.
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loan provisions, as well as by establishing internal screening and
monitoring procedures.53
These provisions, which generally exceed the environmental
regulatory requirements of developing countries, fall into a category
second-order regulatory
as private
of agreements known
agreements. 54 This term demonstrates that these agreements are
55
between private parties, rather than governmental organizations.
These agreements are second-order because "they are entered into in
response to the existence or absence of first-order government
regulatory requirements. '56 With this background in mind, it is
important to examine the potential causes that spurred these private,
profit-driven institutions to incorporate the Equator Principles into
their loan provisions.
B. Potential Causes
Currently, there is no worldwide first-order environmental
regulatory scheme. Generally, international first-order agreements
occur through treaties, which are only binding on the signatories, if at
all. 57 Developed countries prevent large-scale environmental
degradation in their own countries by passing legislation and
monitoring industry activities to ensure compliance. 58 These methods
allow governments of the developed world to set the bar for their own
environmental standards. 59 In sharp contrast, the governments of
the developing world frequently do not have environmental
regulations in place or fail to enforce their established regulatory
scheme.6 0 The lack of environmental regulations in the developing
world, and a failure to establish a worldwide agreement, has allowed
corporations building large-scale developmental projects in the
developing world to set their own bar for environmental standards.
Since establishing and enforcing environmental standards increase
the costs of the project and affect profits, little incentive exists for
these corporations to impose strict environmental standards. As a

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Vandenbergh, supra note 48, at 2031.
Id.
Id.
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of

InternationalRelations Theory and InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 147-51

(1996).
Barb Filas: An Interview with the 2005 SME President, MINING
58.
ENGINEERING, Mar. 2005, at 19, available at http://me.smenet.org/2OO503/pdf/
min0503_17.pdf.
Id.
59.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 21-22.
60.
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result, projects in the developing world frequently have resulted in
large-scale environmental degradation.
Previously, developmental organizations such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were able to regulate
industry activities in the developing world. 61 The mission of these
organizations is to reduce poverty and improve standards of living in
developing nations. 62 To compensate for a country's absence of
environmental standards, developmental organizations would
incorporate environmental and social guidelines into the loan
agreements of the projects they financed. 6 3 Over time, the growing
dependency on the World Bank and the IMF to fund these projects
caused their guidelines to become the prevailing environmental and
social standards for international project finance in the developing
64
world.
Recently, funding for large-scale developmental projects has
shifted from international developmental organizations to private
financial institutions.6 5 These private institutions are not subject to
the World Bank's environmental guidelines for the projects they
independently finance. 66 Initially, private banks incorporated little to
no environmental standards into their loan agreements.6 7 This
disparity in the environmental standards of the World Bank's loan
agreements and those of private financial institutions allowed
projects that failed to meet the requisite environmental standards of
the World Bank to seek and gain financing through the private
sector. 68
As a result, despite the World Bank's influence, the
environmental standards for projects in countries with poor
environmental regulations are once again largely dependent upon
69
private, profit-driven organizations.
This dependency on private financial institutions has resulted in
the construction of projects with devastating environmental
impacts.70 A notable example is the funding of the Three Gorges

61.
The
World
Bank, About
Us,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/,,pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.ht
ml (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
62.
Id.
63.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22.
64.
65.

Id.
See Rachel Kyte, Principles in Question, THE BANKER, Mar. 7, 2005, at 60

(discussing how private banks provided lending for various projects when various
international organizations refused to do so).
66.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22.
67.
See id. (explaining that private banks have little incentive to incorporate
environmental standards).
68.
Kyte, supra note 65, at 60.
69.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22.
70.
Id.
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Critics of the project speculated that the
Dam in China. 71
construction of the dam would result in the accumulation of large
cesspools of sewage and chemical waste, threaten rare plant and
animal life, and deplete the stock of aquatic life. 72 In 1999, after the
World Bank declined to invest in the project based on "environment
and social grounds," several private financial institutions emerged to
provide funding for the dam. 73 Private institutions' financing of the
project despite the World Bank's refusal resulted in a "public
74
uproar."
The decision to fund the Three Gorges Dam despite the negative
environmental and social consequences thrust private financial
institutions into the public spotlight. 75 NGOs increased their scrutiny
of these lending institutions. 76 This shifted the focus of NGOs'
scrutiny from the companies directly involved in the construction of
the projects to the private institutions providing the financial
backing. 77 Public scrutiny of bank activity can be extremely
detrimental to a bank's reputation, leading to a devaluation of a
bank's brand and potentially a decrease in the stock price. 78 To avoid
the negative publicity, private banks began to incorporate into their
financial agreements environmental standards that go above and
beyond the standards of the country where the project is being
constructed.7 9 This demand set the stage for banks to adopt the
Equator Principles, which provide a uniform standard for private
environmental regulations.

71.

James A. Snyder & Arthur B. Muir, Green Wave or Greenwash?, SECURED

LENDER, Nov. 1, 2005, at 32, 36.

Reuters, China's Three Gorges Dam - Eco-boon or Cesspool?, CNN.COM, Nov.
72.
4, 1997, available at www.cnn.com/EARTH/9711/04/china.dam.reut/.
73.
Snyder & Muir, supra note 71, at 36. See also Kyte, supra note 65, at 60
("[W]hen the US Export Import Bank and the World Bank both refused to finance
China's controversial Three Gorges Dam, private banks, unhampered by public
scrutiny, stepped in and filled the gap.").
74.
Snyder & Muir, supra note 71, at 36.
Id.
75.
76.
Kyte, supra note 65, at 60.
Fiona Harvey, Rise of the Ethical Financier FT Sustainable Banking
77.
Awards: Environmental and Social Responsibility are Increasingly Important in Banks'
Investment Decisions, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2005, at 13.

78.

See generally David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate

Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT.

J. ENVTL. L. 151, 179-180 (2004) (stating that opinions about a corporation have a great
impact on the value of the corporation's brand, which can lead to a decrease in brand
equity, a reduction in the price of the stock, and lower shareholder returns).
79.
Kyte, supra note 65, at 60.
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IV. CRITICISMS OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

The

same NGOs that initially pressured private financial

institutions to adopt the Equator Principles also have been some of
the banks harshest critics.8 0 Specifically, the Equator Principles have
been attacked for their limited scope, their potential risk of
segmentation, their lack of transparency and accountability,8 1 and
their failure to proscribe procedural requirements.8 2 Although the
EPII attempt to correct these problems, the revised Principles are not
retroactive and have not been adopted by all the EPFIs. Because the
original Equator Principles still govern many ongoing financial
projects, it is important to examine these critiques to determine
whether loopholes undercut the Equator Principles' ability to ensure
environmental responsibility. Moreover, an examination of the
current critiques will help future analysts determine whether the
EPII correctly resolve these problems.
The Equator Principles set forth a number of limitations that
narrow the scope of their application. For example, the Equator
Principles only affect direct financing.8 3 Project financing, although
not defined within the Equator Principles, is generally recognized as
a transaction where "a loan is made by one or more banks to finance a
project, but without recourse to persons or entities other than the
project assets."84 However, banks frequently provide financing in
other important ways. For example, a bank frequently will act as a
"financial advisor, underwriter, arranger or lead manager" on a
project.8 5 Accordingly, EPFIs can support a project that dramatically
alters the environment and is outside the parameters of the Equator
86
Principles if the funding is not derived from direct financing.
Moreover, the scope of the Equator Principles is further limited
to projects with a cost of at least $50 million. 87 This monetary
threshold exempts approximately 3% of project lending.8 8 Since the
threshold is cost-based, it is independent of the project's

80.

Missbach, supra note 17.

81.
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, BANKING ON RESPONSIBILITY - PART I
OF FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER EQUATOR PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2005: THE
BANKS
105-11 (July 2005),
available at http://www.freshfields.com/practice/
environment/publications/pdfs/12057.pdf [hereinafter BANKING ON RESPONSIBILITY].

82.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22.
83.
Equator Principles, supra note 12, pmbl. (stating that EPFIs will only
provide direct loans to projects that adhere to the Principles).
84.
Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 21.
85.
Missbach, supra note 17.
86.
Id. Forestry projects are among the most commonly cited examples of banks
indirectly funding environmentally damaging projects. Id.
87.
Equator Principles, supranote 12, 9.
88.
See BANKING ON RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 81, at 11.
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environmental impact. Consequently, a project with low overall costs
but substantial environmental risks will fall outside of the purview of
the Equator Principles.8 9 Thus, the narrow scope of the Equator
Principles permits EPFIs to have a substantial role in funding
projects that negatively impact the environment without violating the
Principles.
The Equator Principles also allow industry to avoid conducting a
thorough environmental impact statement through segmentation.
Segmentation, or piecemealing, occurs when a party separates a
number of related actions into individual actions. 90 Generally, a
private company will segment a project into phases or into individual
but simultaneously implemented actions. 9 1 By piecemealing the
project in this fashion, a party can misrepresent the overall
environmental impact of the project. For example, a party that
prepares individual EAs masks the project's overall environmental
impact and avoids considering the cumulative environmental impacts
of the related actions. 9 2 This misrepresentation could allow a
Category A project to be categorized improperly as a Category B or C
project. Moreover, piecemealing permits the party to include the
reasonable alternatives for only the individual segments. Thus, a
party avoids considering the alternatives for the cumulative project,
thereby making the EA less comprehensive. 93 Finally, if a project is
segmented through phases, the investment in the initial phases,
which may have minimal environmental impact, could compel the
funding of subsequent phases, even if these later phases negatively
impact the environment. 94 Therefore, segmentation can lead to an
EPFI inadvertently funding a project that has severe environmental
impacts.
The problem of segmentation is of particular concern because it
has proven difficult to resolve adequately, even for governments in
the developed world. For example, segmentation has caused frequent
litigation over the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the
United States. 95 Similar to the Equator Principles, the NEPA
requires U.S. federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact

89.
90.
2005).

Id. at

11.
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 9:11 (2d ed. Supp.

91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Charlie Wiggins, Note, Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact
Statement: The Interrelationshipof Impacts, 1976 DUKE L.J. 623, 626 (1976).
95.
See id. at 624 ("Increasingly common is the claim that the scope of an
impact statement is inappropriate-that the federal action under consideration has
been artificially truncated into segments which cannot be meaningfully evaluated in
isolation from one another.").
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statement (EIS) for all "proposals for legislation and other Federal
affecting the quality of the human
actions significantly
'96
In practice, problems arise in the United States
environment.
when federal agencies have to "determined whether to prepare one
impact statement to evaluate a broad multi-year program, a series of
statements to evaluate individual components . . . or the broader
program statement as the component statement. '9 7 Although the
United States is able to address improper segmentation through the
promulgation of agency rules and judicial oversight, the Equator
Principles do not provide EPFIs with similar means to resolve the
issue.9 8 Therefore, EPFIs must create adequate implementation
policies in order to ensure that the project is fully and properly
presented to a bank.
The Equator Principles also have been publicly criticized for
their lack of transparency and accountability to third parties. Since
the Equator Principles are voluntary guidelines that govern private
project financing, there is an inherent lack of publicly disclosed
information. Additionally, based on the confidentiality of these
financial agreements, banks typically do not disclose information
regarding specific projects that have been turned down for their
failure to meet the Equator Principles' standards.9 9 Moreover, the
Equator Principles specifically disavow liability to any "person, public
or private."100 Accordingly, it is the bank's responsibility to perform a
due diligence inquiry into whether a borrower adheres to the Equator
Principles and to enforce compliance. 01' This lack of transparency
and accountability make it difficult for the public to determine the
effectiveness of the Equator Principles, including whether they are
being correctly implemented, and to hold banks accountable for
02
violations of the Principles.
The Equator Principles also have been criticized for their failure
to provide banks with specific procedures on how to perform due
diligence investigations of a project's environmental and social
risks.'0 3 Currently, the Equator Principles only mandate that the

96.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2003).

97.
See Wiggins, supranote 94, at 625.
Id. at 626-28.
98.
Oliver Balch, Principles in the Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 8,
99.
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/O,,1102502,00.html.
Equator Principles, supra note 12.
100.
101. Missbach, supra note 17.
BANK TRACK, PRINCIPLES, PROFITS OR JUST PR?: TRIPLE P INVESTMENTS
102.
UNDER THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 35 (2004), available at http://www.banktrack.orgdoc/

File/BankTrack%20publications/BankTrack%20publications/040604%20Principles%
Profits%20or%20just%20PR%20text%20only%20version.pdf.
103.

CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 6, at 8-10.
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10 4
borrower meet its requirements to the EPFI's satisfaction.
Without a clearly specified and articulated standard or test, there is
no definitive way to determine whether an EPFI's decision to fund a
project complies with the Principles.1 0 5 Accordingly, NGOs and
EPFIs frequently disagree on whether the requirements of the
Equator Principles have been met prior to funding.10 6 This has
of EPFIs that agree to fund projects
created intense public criticism
10 7
over the objections of NGOs.
Furthermore, the Equator Principles' failure to articulate a clear
standard, coupled with the aforementioned accountability problem,
could result in a free rider problem.' 0 8 The Equator Principles
currently provide no recourse against a bank that adopts the
Principles in name only and fails to impose any environmental
standards. If this practice becomes a trend in the banking
community, it would weaken the importance of the pledge by other
financial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles. One of the
major reasons that banks adopt the Equator Principles is to enhance
their public image. 10 9 Therefore, the free rider problem poses a
substantial threat to the survival of the Principles. Critics
accordingly argue that a specific standard of review should be
established to deter the free rider problem and to allow a uniform
way of determining whether a project has met the requirements of
the Equator Principles. 110
As previously stated, the EPF~s launched revised Equator
Principles, EPII, to resolve many of these criticisms. Specifically,
these revisions address the need for a broader scope, increased
external reporting, more accountability, and greater transparency.
However, because EPII are such a recent development, it is still
unclear whether these revisions properly address the current
problems with the Equator Principles.

Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 1, at 22.
104.
Id.
105.
See BANKTRACK, PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS: ANALYSIS OF THE SAKHALIN II OIL
106.
AND GAS PROJECT'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (2005) [hereinafter
BANKTRACK] (arguing the Sakhalin project did not comply with the Equator
Principles).
See Jon Sohn, NGO Spotlight Shifts to Private Sector, ENVT'L. FIN. MAG.,
107.
Feb. 2004, available at https://www.foe.org/new/newsl8.html (discussing NGOs'
criticism of certain EPFIs that financed of the Oleoducto de Crudos Peasdos Pipeline
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline).
See CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 6, at 20.
108.
See Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizumbuga, Institutional Pressures,
109.
CorporateReputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator
Principles, 111 BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 89, 104-07 (2006).
See CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 6, at 21.
110.
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V. INCENTIVES FOR ADHERING TO THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

The success of the Equator Principles is largely dependent upon
the commitment of the EPFIs to adhere to their requirements. By
incorporating environmental provisions in loan agreements, the
EPFIs increase a project's transaction cost. This increase directly
impacts the profits of the company constructing the project and
thereby affects its ability to repay the loan. At first blush, it appears
that adopting the Equator Principles would be detrimental to a
private institution's goal of increasing shareholder profit. Since the
Equator Principles appear to be detrimental to a bank's interest, it is
important to identify the incentives that encourage banks to adopt
Identifying these motivators will help
the Equator Principles.
ascertain how stringently the banks will implement the Principles, as
well as determine whether banks will be able to adhere to the
Principles and still survive amongst their competitors.
EPFIs have indicated that increased risk management is among
the most significant reasons for adopting the Equator Principles. 11 1
Banks have a large incentive to manage the risks of their
investments carefully to ensure repayment of the loan. A project that
creates environmental degradation exposes the borrower to liability.
Depending on the country, the borrower could incur substantial fines
for violating local environmental laws and court fees for defending
against these lawsuits. 112 In addition to these traditional costs, the
borrower's environmental degradation could result in damage to the
reputation of its brand. 1 13 Moreover, these costs in turn could affect
the borrower's ability to repay the loan. The realization by the private
financial sector that environmental degradation can have a
significant negative impact on profits is becoming recognized globally
in the financial sector. 114 By adopting the Equator Principles, the
banks pledge to establish internal policies for project approval and

111.
See Press Release, The Equator Principles, Financial Institutions Announce
Revision of Equator Principles Underscoring the Global Application of Environmental
and Social Risk Management (July 6, 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com
documents/EPReadoption_- PressReleaseFINAL.pdf.
112.
Vandenbergh, supra note 48, at 2052; see Michael M. Phillips & Mitchell
Pacelle, Banks Accept "EquatorPrinciples,"WALL ST. J., June 4, 2003, at A2 (stating
that leaders in multinational private financial institutions recognize the risk of having
the local government or people "interfere with ... or even take [a project] away" if it
significantly harms the environment).
113.
Snyder & Muir, supra note 71, at 36.
See Karen Krebsbach, The Green Revolution: Are Banks SacrificingProfits
114.
for Activists' Principles?, US BANKER, Dec. 2005, available at http://www.usA 2005 PricewaterhouseCooper
banker.com/article.html?id=20051201QN4K913T.
survey of CEOs from 43 countries showed that 87% held the belief that "environmental
sustainability is important to a company's profits," which is an 8% increase from 2004
and an 18% increase from 2003. Id.
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continued monitoring. 115 Through these means, EPFIs improve their
ability to ensure that a project is a more secure investment and
consequently a safer loan.1 16
The EPFIs therefore can gain a
11 7
competitive advantage through strict adherence to the Principles.
For example, as a result of adopting the Equator Principles in June
2003, Citigroup claims that it has benefited through an enhancement
of risk management policies. According to its website, Citigroup
financed three unnamed Category A oil and gas projects in 2004.118
In accordance with the Equator Principles, the borrower created an
EA. 119
These assessments were commented on by the local
community and underwent an independent expert review. 120 In
addition, the borrower prepared an EMP that was included in the
loan documentation. 12 1 Citigroup contends that these processes
increased the company's knowledge regarding the foreseeable
environmental risk of these projects. 122 Moreover, the inclusion of
the EMP in the loan agreement allowed Citibank to continue to
monitor compliance.
Therefore, compliance with the Equator
Principles has the potential to bring about an enhanced position in
the marketplace by protecting the future of an EPFI's investments.
The second advantage of the Equator Principles is that they
increase the uniformity of the environmental requirements needed to
acquire funding from private financial institutions. Prior to the
Equator Principles, private lending institutions frequently would
include some level of environmental standards in their loan
agreements. 123 However, these standards often varied significantly
from bank to bank. Borrowers unconcerned with the environmental
impact of their project could reduce their transaction costs by
shopping the project around until they found a lender with the lowest
environmental protocols. The Equator Principles help prevent this
activity by creating greater uniformity in the environmental

115.
See Phillips & Pacelle, supra note 112.
116.
See id.
117.
See generally Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 165-66 (arguing that
companies that have improved environmental performance "can sometimes gain [a]
competitive advantage, albeit at the margins, through cost avoidance and enhanced
brand reputation").
118.
CITIGROUP, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 2004, 33 (2004) [hereinafter
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT].

119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Jabulani Sikhakhane, Project Finance: Standards for Lending, FIN. MAIL
(Johannesburg), July 25, 2003, available at www.equator-principles.comlfml.shtml
(stating that "[m]ost [South African] financiers already ensure that environmental
issues are dealt with in the due diligence process, risk analysis and project
agreements").
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standards of the banks. 124 For example, each EPFI requires an
initial screening process to categorize the project as a Category A, B,
or C project. 125 Moreover, the uniformity and commonality of the
Equator Principles also make it increasingly difficult for companies to
pit one bank against the other to negotiate down environmental
standards. 126
Finally, the uniformity also provides EPFIs and
borrowers with greater certainty regarding the environmental and
social risk that must be addressed in order to receive funding. 127 In
turn, this commonality will reduce transaction costs and allow for a
faster turnaround in determining whether the project is
environmentally compliant. 128 With approximately 80% of all project
lending in 2003 controlled by EPFIs, it is increasingly difficult for
banks to claim that adopting the Equator Principles puts them at a
competitive disadvantage. 1 29
Therefore, the uniformity of the
Equator Principles makes it easier for projects to proceed, benefiting
both the lender and the borrower.
Finally, adherence to the Principles helps protect the reputation
of the EPFIs. Through both protests and grassroots campaigning,
NGOs have shifted the focus of their campaigns from the companies
130
performing the work on the project to the companies funding them.
In addition, a general shift in consumer consciousness has caused a
heightened level of scrutiny to ensure a company is acting
responsibly. 1 31 As private lending institutions increase their funding
for financial projects in the developing world, these institutions are
becoming the targets of NGOs with greater frequency. 132 To continue
to invest in these projects while avoiding negative media coverage, it

124.

Banks Agree New Loan Guidelines, 5 ETHICAL PERFORMANCE, July 2003,

availableat http://www.equator-Principles.com/ethper.shtml.
125.
Id.
126.
Suellen Lazarus, The Equator Principles: A Milestone or Just Good PR?,
GLOBAL AGENDA, Jan. 26, 2004, available at http://www.globalagendamagazine.com/

2004/suellenlazarus.asp.
127.
Justin Smith & Lisa Plit, Financiers Must Meet Criteria, BUS. DAY
(Johannesburg), July 14, 2003, available at http:llwww.businessday.co.za/Articles/
TarkArticle.aspx?ID=796467.
128.
See id.
129.
Demetri Sevastopulos, Banks in Drive for Project Principles, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 9, 2003, at 30.
130.
See Krebsbach, supra note 114. For example, in April 2005 protestors from
Rainforest Action Network protested outside JPMorgan Chase's New York and Chicago
offices in opposition of the company's funding of a mining project in Peru and logging in
Indonesia, and in October 2005 the Global Finance Campaign protested Wells Fargo's
current environmental practices, which they believed to be "outdated." Id.
131.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 173 ("Publicly-traded businesses
are now under an unprecedented level of scrutiny from investors, government, and the
media to prove their dedication to scrupulous corporate governance and to demonstrate
a higher degree of corporate responsibility.").
132.
See Phillips & Pacelle, supra note 112.
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is essential that banks meet the public's expectations, which often
exceed the local laws of the country. 133 The standards used by the
IFC, which are integrated into the Equator Principles, are widely
accepted as providing an effective means to ensure that the projects
being funded are environmentally and socially sound. Thus, by
Principles, the EPFIs can more
accepting and enforcing the Equator
134
criticism.
public
to
respond
easily
In addition to NGOs, socially responsible investment groups
more
to become
organizations
financial
private
pressure
135
Socially responsible investing is "an
environmentally conscious.
investment process that considers the social and environmental
consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the
context of rigorous financial analysis. ' 13 6 The managers of these
funds routinely factor in the methods companies use to "disclose their
social and environmental impacts, risks, and performance and
whether they use reporting standards or adhere to codes of
conduct." 137 The investment firm then offers mutual funds or
investment products in companies that are determined to be socially
responsible based on the screening process. 138 In 2005, approximately
$2.3 trillion was invested in investment products that utilized socially
responsible investing. 139 This value equates to approximately one out
140
of every ten professionally managed dollars in the United States.
Accordingly, by adopting and ensuring compliance with the Equator
Principles, EPFIs can maintain an environmentally conscious image,
which may prevent losing investments from these socially responsible
investment groups. Moreover, a company that may have acquired a
reputation as being environmentally irresponsible may be able to
14 1
enhance its corporate image by adopting the Equator Principles.
However, the impact of the Equator Principles on the brand image
will be short-lived if the adopting bank fails to adhere to the
Principle's requirements. 142 Therefore, an EPFI must establish and

133.

Jay G. Martin & Ann L. MacNaughton, Sustainable Development: Impacts

of Current Trends on Oil and Gas Development, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

257, 263 (2004).
134.
Id. at 264.
135.
Snyder & Muir, supra note 71, at 36.
136.
See SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 10-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2006) [hereinafter 2005

REPORT] ("[O]ne or more of the three core strategies that define socially responsible
investing [are]: screening, shareholder advocacy, and community investing.").
Id. at 5.
137.
Id.
138.
139.
See id. at 1.
See id.
140.
Andrew Balls & David Wighton, Gray Whales Hold the Key to Fate of
141.
Voluntary Guidelines, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2005, at 2.

142.

See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 165.
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maintain credible and transparent policies that ensure compliance
with the Principles. 143 In this way, the Equator Principles can
increase the revenue flow of the private financial institutions by
acquiring and keeping investment from socially responsible
investment groups.

VI. SAKHALIN II: A TEST CASE
Three years after the inception of the Equator Principles, their
success is still uncertain. NGOs continue to critique the EPFIs'
commitment to the Principles and their funding of large-scale
projects. In particular, Credit Suisse First Bank, an EPFI, has
received a great deal of criticism for its role as an advisor to the
consortium of businesses involved in the funding of the Sakhalin II
project.' 44 As a result of the project's size and Credit Suisse's
prominent role, many NGOs consider Sakhalin II to be the "test case"
in establishing the level of commitment of the EPFIs to adhering to
145
the Equator Principles.
The Sakhalin II project is led by Royal Dutch Shell, which
proclaims that the project "represents the largest single foreign direct
investment project in Russia,"'1 46 and the "most advanced of the
offshore projects on the Sakhalin shelf."'147 The Sakhalin Islands are
located on Russia's eastern coast, and the goal of the project is to
develop two fields located to the east of the island. 148 It is estimated
that the development of these fields will reap over one billion barrels
14 9
of crude oil and 500 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

143.

Id.

144.
Press Release, Rainforest Action Network, Global Coalition on
Environmental and Human Rights to CSFB: "Oil is Over, Fund the Future," (June 30,
2005),
http://ran.org/media-center/news-article/?uid=1527
[hereinafter
Global
Coalition].
145.
Id.
146.
The Shell Group, The Sakhalin II Project: Latest News and Information,
http://www.shell.com/ (search for "Sakhalin II project"; then follow "Media Center The Sakhalin II Project: Latest News and Information" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 22,
2006). ,
147.
See Sakahalin Oil and Gas Conferences Moves From.... http://www.
sakhalinenergycom/enldefault.asp?p=channel&c=3&n=46 (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
148.
Aver Kvaerner, Sakhalin - Concrete Advance in Russia, http:Hwww.
akerkvaerner.com/Internet/MediaCentre/Featurestories/OilandGas/Sakhalin.htm
(last
visited Dec. 22, 2006).
149.
The Shell Group, Sakhalin II, http://www.shell.com (follow "Exploration
and Production" hyperlink under "Shell for Businesses" heading; then follow "Major
ongoing projects" hyperlink; then follow "Sakhalin II" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 22,

2006).
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The project is staged in two phases. Phase 1 was completed in
1999 and is currently in seasonal production due to the ice build-up
during the winter months. 150 This phase consisted of the construction
of an offshore production platform, where oil is transported by shuttle
tankers to an onshore facility. 15 1 Phase 2 of the project will consist of
more offshore production platforms, onshore facilities, and pipelines
that will link the platforms constructed during Phases 1 and 2 with
the shore. 152 The completion of Phase 2 will permit year-round oil
production. 153 The Sakhalin II project is estimated to cost over $11
billion and is claimed to be "the largest single integrated oil and gas
1 54
project ever undertaken.'
The environmental impact of the Sakhalin II project is highly
controversial. NGOs believe the Sakhalin II project will significantly
threaten the endangered western gray whale population, damage the
155
wild salmon population, and pollute the fisheries of the Aniva Bay.
Furthermore, there is a concern that a tanker accident or ruptured
pipeline will cause a large oil spill, which could permanently damage
the ecological system.156 On the other hand, Shell maintains that it
is "commit[ed] to delivering a world-class oil and gas project that will
be safe, environmentally sound, and will maximize the benefits to all
those involved."'1 57 These two contrasting views have resulted in
global debate over whether Phase 2 of the Sakhalin II project should
proceed.
Because EPFIs are involved in funding the project, the Sakhalin
II project should adhere to the Equator Principles in order to receive
funding. However, there has been intense criticism over the project's
failure to meet the guidelines of the Equator Principles. 158
In
accordance with the Equator Principles, Shell created an EA for the

150.
Sakhalin II Crude Oil and Liquified Natural Gas, Sakhalin Island, Russia,
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/sakhalin2/
(last visited Dec. 22,
2006).
151.
See Press Release, Aver Kvaerner, Aver Kvaerner Contract for Arctic Bow
Loading Systems, (Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.akerkvaerner.com/Internet/MediaCentre/
PressReleasesAllAKPressRelease_1038423.htm.
152.
Press Release, Sakhalin Energy, Sakhalin Energy Signs Major LNG Supply
Deal with Tokyo Gas, (May 12, 2006), http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/
media.asp?p=media_ page&itmID=42.
153.
Id.
154.
BANKTRACK, supra note 106, at 6.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Ian Craig, CEO, Sakhalin Energy, Address at the 10th Sakhalin Oil and
Energy Gas Conference (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/default.
asp?p=channel&c=l&n=130.
158.
BANKTRACK, supra note 106, at 4-5.
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Sakhalin II project. 15 9 However, NGOs have criticized Shell's
assessment. The NGOs claim, among other things, that the EA fails
to include key environmental impacts, specific information regarding
endangered species, mitigation measures, and an evaluation of the
conflicts with local environmental laws. 160 Moreover, the EA lacks
161
clarity regarding the environmental protection status of the region.
Additionally, some of the data conflicts with reports issued by experts
in the field. 162 Furthermore, Shell has yet to perform a comment
period seeking the participation of the local population or publish an
EMP. 163 If these failings are accurate and left uncorrected, they will
cause the project to violate the Equator Principles. Accordingly,
NGOs have intensely criticized the EPFIs and are calling for a
164
withdrawal of all support of the project.
Whether the Sakhalin II project should or does proceed, the
Equator Principles have had a significant effect on the public's
response to the environmental concerns of building large-scale
projects. First, the controversy over the project's environmental
impact and assessment has caused several EPFIs to refrain from
financing the project. 165 Additionally, the EA provides NGOs with
an opportunity to comment publicly regarding the specific
inadequacies of the assessment, referencing key provisions of the
Equator Principles. 166 This public criticism has led some socially
1 67
responsible investing groups to sell their shares of Shell.
Therefore, the Equator Principles have created a shift in the
marketplace, giving the public more leverage for influencing private
actors to make environmentally and socially conscious decisions.

159.
Sakhalin Energy, Environmental Impact Assessment, available at
http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/library.asp?p=lib sel eia20032005&l=eia-2003 (last
visited Dec. 22, 2006).
160.
161.

BANKTRACK, supra note 106, at 144.
Id.

162.
Id.
163.
See Global Coalition, supranote 144.
164.
Id. ("Eight international civil society groups placed a full page ad in the
Financial Times today urging Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) to uphold its
sustainability commitments and sever its relationship as financial advisor to the
controversial Sakhalin II project.").
165.
See id. .
166.

See BANKTRACK, supra note 106, at 11-15.

167.

See Global Coalition, supra note 144.
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THE FUTURE OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES

A. Liability
One issue that has not been tested in court is whether an EPFI
can be sued in either U.S. or foreign courts for violation of the
Equator Principles. If a suit could be brought against an EPFI for
violating the Equator Principles, it could have significant
ramifications. 168 First, the potential liability would provide NGOs
with a heavy hammer for alleged violations of the Equator Principles.
Consequently, this threat would increase the incentives for the EPFIs
to strictly screen and monitor projects to avoid violations of the
Principles. Also, liability based on the Equator Principles would
169
create a large disincentive for future banks to adopt the Principles.
Finally, the liability likely would cause banks that have already
adopted the Equator Principles to abandon the Principles in order to
avoid future lawsuits. 170
Although determining whether a suit
brought against an EPFI for violating the Equator Principles would
survive in court is beyond the scope of this Note, the following
analysis discusses potential claims that are likely to be brought
against the EPFIs.
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 171 is one possible avenue to bring a
claim against the EPFIs in a U.S. District Court. The ATS provides
federal subject matter jurisdiction for "any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."'1 72 In 2004, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain 73 narrowly interpreted sources of customary international
law to include only that which is universally recognized, specific, and
followed out of a sense of legal obligation. 174 Prior to Sosa, the ATS
had been used to gain federal subject matter jurisdiction over
corporations for aiding and abetting violations of international
laws. 175 However, lower courts are not unified as to whether the
Supreme Court's holding in Sosa left room for aiding and abetting

168.
Owen C. Pell & Richard A. Horsch, Doing Good Need Not Be Risky: Rulings
May Mitigate Any Liability From Following Guidelines For Investing In Global
Development, 28 NAT'L L.J. 13, 13 (2005) ("Any exposure would ... limit the reach of
the Principles, notwithstanding their worthy goals.")
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
172.
Id.
173.
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
174.
See Pell & Horsch, supra note 168.
175.
See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim under international law against
defendant banks for aiding and abetting in violations of international law); see also Pell
& Horsch, supra note 168.
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liability under the ATS. For example, in In re South African
Apartheid Litigation,176 the plaintiff sued several multinational
corporations alleging they were violating international law for, among
other things, providing resources to the South African government
during the apartheid regime. 177 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York stated that the ATS "does not provide for aider
and abettor liability ..."178 However, in In Re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held that "historical evidence.., supported aiding and abetting
under the terms of the ATS."'1 79 Thus, it is uncertain whether postSosa courts will allow claims for aiding and abetting violations of
international law to continue to be brought under the ATS.
Even assuming that the court permits aiding and abetting, the
party still has to establish that there was a violation of international
law. Generally, only causes of actions alleging severe human rights
abuses, such as genocide or human rights abuses, survive a motion to
80
dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Although there is a clear interdependency of environmental
degradation and human rights,' 8 ' violations of environmental laws
have yet to rise to the level of a violation of international customary
law under the Sosa standard. 8 2 For example, in Flores v. Southern
Peru Cooper Corp., claims were brought against the Southern Peru
Cooper Corporation alleging that the pollution resulting from the
company's mining operation was a violation of customary
international law.' 8 3 The plaintiff specifically alleged that these
activities infringed upon the plaintiffs right to life, health, and
sustainable development.' 8 4 The court held that the plaintiff failed to
provide sufficient evidence to prove that "local environmental

176.
In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
177.
Id. at 545-46.
178.
Id. at 550. But see Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern
Foundationsfor Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L.
REV. 805, 828-29 (2005) (arguing that despite recent "roadblocks," aiding and abetting
would have been recognized in the eighteenth century and therefore the ATS provides
for this cause of action).
179.
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y.2005);
see also Diskin, supra note 178, at 828; Pell & Horsch, supra note 168.
180.
Diskin, supra note 178, at 815-16.
181.
See Kinley & Tadaki, supranote 10, at 983.
182.
Id. ("The disagreement and debate over whether there is, or should be, a
free-standing right to a healthy environment persists within the canon of human rights
law."). See Pell & Horsch, supra note 160 ("In rejecting claims premised on
international environmental law, Flores emphasized that legitimate sources of
international law should be interpreted narrowly to include 'formal lawmaking and
official actions of States,' such as treaties ratified by a majority of states and to which
those states have consistently adhered.").
183.
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2003).
184.
Id. at 237.
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pollution violates customary international law."' 8 5 In both Sosa and
Flores, the court narrowly interpreted the sources of international
customary law. If this trend continues, "the Equator Principles
should not be considered established international law that might be
actionable under the [ATS].' 18 6 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the
EPFIs will be exposed to liability for aiding and abetting under the
87
ATS.'
In addition to the ATS, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) provides another means by which banks
potentially can be held liable for violations of the Equator
Principles. 8 8 The SEC regulates the disclosures of publicly traded
89
U.S. corporations to prevent false statements to investors.'
Specifically, a plaintiff can state a claim against a corporation under
Section 10(b) 190 and Rule 10b-5191 by pleading the following:
(1) the defendant made a materially false or misleading statement or
omitted to state a material fact necessary to make a statement not
misleading; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or
and (5) the
sale of securities; (4) upon which the plaintiff relied;
192
plaintiffs reliance was the proximate cause of its injury.

In order to satisfy the rule's requirements, courts consistently require
the statement to be about information that is "important to a
reasonable investor in making his or her investment decisions" and
made with the intent to deceive or manipulate. 193 Moreover, the
statement must be false and contain a material fact. 194 Although
materiality is a subjective standard and case specific, some courts
have found this requirement to be fulfilled by misstatements of
environmental objectives. 195 Accordingly, it is conceivable that a
bank that adopted the Equator Principles in order deceive socially
responsible investors (and was successful in doing so) could be
brought into court.

Id. at 265-66.
185.
See Pell & Horsch, supra note 168.
186.
Id.
187.
188.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 183.
189.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003).
190.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
191.
192.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 183.
193.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
194.
Id. at 183-86. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United
195.
Paperworker Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co. theoretically indicates that the failure to
make information regarding negative environmental performance available to
shareholders would be a material omission if the company otherwise made statements
indicating a commitment to enhanced environmental policies. See id.; see also United
Paperworker Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Even assuming these requirements have been met, the courts
have not set a clear standard regarding the requirement of
detrimental reliance or injury. Therefore, it is unclear whether a
socially responsible investor could prove detrimental reliance or
196
injury if a bank fails to meet its own environmental objectives.
However, the shift in the marketplace is leading to growing numbers
of socially responsible investors that rely equally or, in some cases,
more heavily upon a company's environmental policies than its profits
when making investment decisions. 197 Based on this trend, it is
becoming increasingly likely that a socially responsible investor will
meet the detrimental reliance and injury requirements of the SEC
rules if a bank consciously fails to meet the objectives of the Equator
Principles.' 9"
Other potential claims against EPFIs that could be filed in the
United States for violating the Equator Principles generally would
fall into the realm of fraud or false advertising. 199 Recently, the
Kasky v. Nike decision suggested that companies will be held
accountable for failing to reach the objectives of voluntary
environmental policies, such as those stated in the Equator
Principles. 200 In Kasky, Nike publicly stated that that its employees
work in healthy and safe conditions and are paid a living wage in
response to allegations of human rights violations and "for the
purpose of maintaining and increasing its sales and profits. '20 1 The
plaintiffs asserted that Nike's statements were false statements of
fact and therefore constituted false advertising. 20 2 Nike, on the other
hand, asserted that the First Amendment right to free speech
protected the statements. 20 3 Overturning the California Court of
Appeals, the California Supreme Court held that Nike's statements
were commercial speech and therefore not fully protected by the First
Amendment. 20 4 Accordingly, the state laws prohibiting false and
misleading statements applied to Nike's statements regarding its
205
employment practices.

196.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 184.
197.
See 2005 REPORT, supra note 136, at 2 ("Social investment managers often
overlay a qualitative analysis of corporate policies, practices, and impacts onto the
traditional quantitative analysis of profit potential.").
198.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 189 ("Having committed itself in
a particular company policy, code or practice, it is not unrealistic to say, as legal matter
or otherwise, that the marketplace had come to rely on what the company had
stated.").
199.
Snyder & Muir, supranote 71, at 70.
200.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 192.
201.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 947 (2002).
202.
Id. at 945.
203.
Id. at 946.
204.
Id. at 969-70.
205.
Id. at 946.
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Nike petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of the
California court's decision. The Supreme Court denied the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, sidestepping the constitutional
question. 20 6 After the Supreme Court's denial of the writ, the case
was allowed to proceed in California state court to determine whether
Nike's statement indeed violated California's false advertising
laws.2 0 7 However, Nike settled the case out of court. Therefore, the
question of whether Nike was liable for public statements concerning
the treatment of foreign workers remains unanswered. 20 8
Although Kasky leaves a lot of unanswered questions, 20 9 it does
indicate a trend toward holding companies responsible for statements
regarding their environmental commitment. 210 Therefore, if an EPFI
fails to establish policies and procedures to ensure environmentally
and socially responsible investing, such a failure may expose the bank
to liability to socially responsible investors. 21 1 However, to be
entitled to monetary damages, the pleadings requirements for fraud
or false advertising present a high bar for plaintiffs. Generally,
plaintiffs must first establish actual damages as well as a causal link
between the EPFI's misrepresentations and the investor's loss of
money.2 12 Even if an EPFI funded a project that damaged the
environment, it would be difficult for socially responsible investment
groups to prove damages if that investment earned a profit. Thus,
despite the recent decision in Kasky, it remains to be seen whether a
socially responsible investment group will be able to prevail in court
and receive relief against an EPFI for violations of the Equator
Principles.

See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (per curiam) cert. denied, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003);
206.
see also Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 195.
207.
Id.
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 78, at 195.
208.
209.
See id. at 198 (arguing that by sidestepping the constitutional issue, the
Supreme Court failed to clearly indicate whether companies are entitled to First
Amendment constitutional protection for their environment and socially responsible
public statements).
210.
Id. at 198-99 (stating that the California court's treatment of the case
arguably raises the need for veracity in a company's commitment of corporate social
responsibility to the level required for statements regarding financial commitments).
211.
Id. at 38, 70 ("Under such circumstances, it would not be hard to imagine
an influential interest group like the Sierra Club putting together a class-action
lawsuit on behalf of its membership.").
212.
United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
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B. The EquatorPrinciplesII
i.

Methodology Behind the Changes

The EPFIs revised the Equator Principles and launched the EPII
in June 2006. These revisions were necessary to ensure consistency
with the February 2006 IFC updates, whereby the IFC replaced its
Safeguard Policies with new Performance Standards. 213 Because the
Equator Principles are based on these Safeguard Policies, a revision
was needed to reflect the changes. However, the EPII revisions go
beyond merely ensuring consistency with the Safeguard Policies and
include changes to the scope and substantive requirements of the
Equator Principles. Examination of these revisions and how they
were made is important in analyzing the overall impact of the
Equator Principles.
The revision process is significant because it demonstrates
increased communication between the private sector and NGOs.
During this process, the EPFIs maintained
an ongoing
communication with clients in various sectors and industries, NGOs,
and environmental practitioners. 2 14 Based on client feedback, the
EPFIs incorporated suggested changes into a proposed EPII and
released this version for public comment. The EPFIs then received
comment from NGOs and other official agencies. 2 15 Some of these
comments were ultimately implemented in the final EPII. The EPFIs
also addressed why other comments were not incorporated into the
EPII. 216 Accordingly, the EPFIs not only maintained an open
dialogue with the public, but they also used the public's comments to
improve the final version of the EPII.
This revision process demonstrates a unique interplay between
the EPFIs and NGOs. Instead of the traditional method of the NGOs
using public criticism to motivate change in the private sector, the
private and public sectors in this circumstance had a more open line
of communication. 2 17 In turn, this collaboration led to higher
environmental and social standards. Although the ultimate goal is
improved environmental conditions, the ongoing communication

213.
The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions about the Equator
Principles,
4, www.equator-principles.com/faq.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter FAQ].
214.
Id.
17.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
The Equator Principles, Charles Prince, Balancing Economic Growth and
Environmental-Social
Responsibility,
http://www.equator-principles.combcg.shtml
(last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
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between the private sector and the public represents a marked
improvement in the marketplace.
ii.

Changes to the Equator Principles

The EPII implement several changes that attempt to address the
public's critiques of the original Equator Principles. These changes
broaden the scope of the Equator Principles, increase the number of
responsibilities for the borrowers and EPFIs, and require more
covenants between the borrower and the EPFI.
First, the EPII broaden the scope of the Equator Principles by
decreasing the monetary threshold requirement. The Principles now
are applicable to new projects with a total capital cost in excess of $10
million. 2 18 In addition, although not retroactive, the EPII apply to
any expansion or upgrade of an existing facility that creates a
significant environmental or social impact. 2 19 The EPII further
increase the scope of the Principles by making them applicable when
EPFIs undertake financial advisory activities. 220 Thus, when an
EPFI acts as a financial advisor, it must: (1) make the client aware of
the Principles, (2) inform the client of the potential benefit of
applying the Principles to the proposed project, and (3) request that
client adhere to the Principles when seeking financing. By lowering
the threshold cost and expanding their application to advisory
activities, the EPII address many of the criticisms regarding the
Equator Principles' limited scope.
In addition to the changes in the Principles' scope, the EPII also
incorporate substantive changes. First, the borrower must conduct a
Social and Environmental Assessment (SEA) for every Category A
and B project. 221 Moreover, the EPII require the borrower to ensure
that the projects adhere to the then-applicable Performance
Standards 2 22 and industry-specific environmental, health, and safety
guidelines (EHS Guidelines) 223 used by the IFC. 224 These new

218.
219.
220.
221.

See Equator Principles, supra note 12, at "Scope."
Id.
Id.
Id. at Statement of Principles, 2.
See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, WORLD

222.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'S

BANK GROUP,
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOCIAL &

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (Apr. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ifc.orglifcext
enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol-PerformanceStandards2006-full$FILE/IFC+Perfor
mance+Standards.pdf.
223.
As with the EHS Guidelines, the IFC uses the environmental guidelines
contained in the Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook (PPAH), as well as a
series of guidelines published on its website. See International Finance Corporation,
Environmental Health and Safety Guidelines, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsfl
Content/EnvironmentalGuidelines (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
224.
See Equator Principles, supra note 12, Principle 3.
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standards incorporate more regulations regarding labor standards
than the previous Safeguard Policies. The revisions also require
borrowers to prepare an Action Plan (AP). 225 An AP describes "the
actions needed to implement mitigation measures, corrective actions
and monitoring measures necessary to manage the impacts and risks
identified in the [SEA]. '' 226 Thus, the EPII require borrowers to go
beyond merely addressing environmental concerns and also consider
the social risks of projects.
In addition, the EPII create a grievance mechanism for Category
A and certain Category B projects. 227 Pursuant to this provision, the
borrower is obligated to include a grievance mechanism in its
management system. This mechanism will allow the borrower to
hear individual and group concerns regarding the project's social and
environmental performance. The borrower, in turn, addresses these
grievances in a "culturally appropriate manner. ' 228 Through this
process, the EPFIs should be able to create an ongoing dialogue
between the borrower and local community to help reduce the social
and environmental impact.
The EPII also address the accountability critiques in several
ways. First, the EPII increase the number of covenants between the
EPFIs and the borrowers. Specifically, the EPII require the borrower
to covenant to comply with the host country's social and
environmental laws as well as the AP. 2 29 The borrower must also
covenant to decommission the facilities in accordance with a
230
decommission plan.
In addition to these covenants, the EPII also include
independent review requirements. 231 For example, the borrower must
employ an independent social or environmental expert to examine the
SEA, AP, and other documentation to ensure compliance with the
EPII and assist with the EPFI's due diligence requirements.2 32 The
borrower is also required to retain an independent expert to verify
monitoring information to ensure proper monitoring and reporting
over the life of the loan. 233
Thus, independent reviews make
borrowers and EPFIs aware of, and accordingly more accountable for,
violations of the Equator Principles.

225.
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227.
228.
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230.
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233.

Id. at 3.
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Id., Principle 6.
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Id., Principle 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the EPII address transparency concerns. Specifically,
the borrower must provide annual reports that demonstrate its
compliance with the AP. 234 The EPFIs are also required to report
publicly, at least annually, about their "Equator Principles
implementation processes and experience, taking into account
appropriate confidentiality considerations. '2 35 At a minimum, these
reports must include: "the number of transactions screened by each
EPFI, including the categorisation accorded to transactions (and may
include a breakdown by sector or region), and information regarding
implementation. '236 Although these reports are limited to information
that will not violate the borrowers' confidentiality, these disclosures
should increase the EPFIs level of transparency regarding their
implementation of the Equator Principles.
Currently, thirty-three of the forty original institutions to adopt
the original Equator Principles have adopted the EPII. 237 Because
EPFIs have only recently adopted the EPII, little information exists
regarding their effect on the marketplace. However, the EPII are an
important evolution to private environmental action. Therefore,
future study is warranted to examine whether all of the EPFIs adopt
the EPII, whether the adopting institutions are adhering to the
higher standards, and if so, whether the EPII are correcting the
problems generated by the original Equator Principles.
C. The Impact of the EquatorPrinciples
Three years after their initial inception, there are differing and
contested perspectives on the overall impact of the Equator
Principles.
Many in the banking industry strongly praise the
Equator Principles as representing a major shift in the banking
industry, whereby the private sector has taken a leading role in
ensuring environmentally and socially sound corporate action. 238
Generally, NGOs agree that the Equator Principles are a step in the
right direction. 23 9 Examining the impact of the Equator Principles

234.
Id., Principle 10.
235.
Id.
236.
Id., n.6.
237.
E-mail from Leonie Schreve, Secretariat Equator Principles, ING Group, to
Andrew Hardenbrook, student, Vanderbilt University Law School (Sept. 7, 2006, 02:04
CST) (on file with author).
238.
Andrew Newton, Equator Principles:A Convenient Truce, ETHICAL CORP.,
Nov. 2006, at 14-15, available at http://www.equator.principles.com/documents
/ECFinanceSpecialReportNov2006.pdf.
239.
BANKTRACK, SHAPING THE FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE: MOVING
FROM PAPER PROMISES TO PERFORMANCE 13 (2006), available at http://www.banktrack.

org/doc/File/BankTrack%2Opublications/BankTrack%2OpublicationsO60126%2OSustai
nable%20finance%20summary.pdf ("While adoption of the Equator Principles has been

2007]

THE EQ A TOR PRINCIPLES

thus far on the environment and industry will help shed light on
whether the Principles are in fact reducing environmental
degradation and influencing corporation decision-making.
The actual environmental impact of the Equator Principles is
difficult to measure. The EPFIs assert that the Equator Principles
240
continually shape their funding decisions for project finance.
However, verifying these claims is problematic for several reasons.
First, due to the lack of transparency inherent in the Equator
Principles and the banking industry, it is difficult to examine
whether or not banks are denying projects they determine to be
environmentally harmful. 24 1 This same flaw also makes it difficult to
determine whether banks have required companies to amend project
proposals in order to comply with the Equator Principles. Therefore,
NGOs tend to focus on the projects that the EPFIs have funded,
which are more visible and publicized than the projects the EPFIs
have refused to finance. 242 This consequently has led to intense
public criticism when the Equator Principles have failed and
relatively little media coverage when they have succeeded. Therefore,
examining only the projects that have been approved by the EPFIs
since their adoption of the Principles is not the best way to ascertain
whether the Principles are a success.
Another way to determine whether the Equator Principles
impact banking decisions is to examine the policies and procedures
that these financial institutions have implemented to meet the
requirements of the Equator Principles. First, a bank must create an
overall environmental management system to ensure proper
implementation of the Equator Principles. 243 In 2005, of the thirtynine EPFIs that had adopted the Equator Principles, four had not
systems. 244
management
environmental
internal
established
Although the remaining institutions have set forth some kind of
internal environmental management systems, the quality and
comprehensiveness of these systems vary greatly depending on the
financial institution. 24 5 Some banks have "clear environmental

a welcome development, it marks only the beginning of the path to sustainable
finance.").
240.

See CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 6, at 13.

241.
Id.
("It is not evident how the Principles have influenced financing
decisions, shaped the overall portfolios of signatories, or how they have been
interpreted and applied in any given project.").
242.
Id. at 15 (referencing the EPFIs' funding of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline and the Sakhalin II oil project).
243.
Id. at 11.
244.

Id. at 11.

245.
Id. (stating that KBC focuses on reducing its direct environmental
footprint, BBVA is still creating its system, and Calyon uses an unstructured
approach).
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governance structures and longstanding environmental policies,"
while others are "satisfied with an unstructured approach towards
environmental risk management. '246 Since one of the advantages of
the Equator Principles is to provide a level playing field among the
banks, this lack of uniformity among the EPFI's environmental
management systems jeopardizes the success of the Equator
Principles.
Second, it is important for banks to install appropriate
monitoring and auditing systems. 247 Similar to the environmental
management system, the level of implementation of these systems
varies among the institutions. 248 At one end of the spectrum, several
banks have implemented high levels of monitoring, requiring their
environmental management systems to be externally audited. 249 At
the other end, some of the EPFIs have committed very few resources
to ensure compliance with their environmental plans, merely publicly
reporting the funding on their finance transactions. 250 Since it is
crucial for a bank to ensure that the written policies are being put
into practice, the failure of some of the EPFIs to implement adequate
monitoring is a distressing signal which suggests that the adoption of
the Equator Principles for these banks was nothing more than
propaganda.
Third, since EPFIs are unfamiliar with many of the
environmental procedures, it is critical to train new and existing
25 1
personnel to ensure compliance with the Equator Principles.
Generally, the EPFIs-with the assistance of the IFC-have
implemented fairly extensive training programs. 252 However, few
banks are engaging outside consultants for consultation on specific
projects or creating new positions for employees whose sole function
would be to implement and ensure compliance with the Equator
253
Principles.
Finally, it is necessary to examine whether there have been any
254
changes in loan covenants between the EPFI and the borrower.
This is perhaps the most important indication of an EPFI's
commitment to the Equator Principles, because it gives banks legal
redress if the corporation fails to fully comply with the Equator
Principles. Although the EPII mandate an increase in the number of
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247.
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covenant requirements between the bank and borrower, little
information exists regarding the fulfillment of this obligation beyond
what the bank makes publicly available. In Citibank's Citizenship
Report, the company stated that Category A transactions include5
25
covenants requiring a full environmental management plan.
Moreover, HSBC amended its standard loan agreement to include a
covenant requiring borrowers to complete a full environmental
management plan. 25 6 Although these two companies' actions
demonstrate that the Equator Principles are having some impact on
loan agreements, without more information it is difficult to determine
whether the Equator Principles are changing the language of loan
agreements on a broader scale.
In addition to the changes in individual banking practices, the
Equator Principles are altering the banking industry in general. As
more banks adopt the Equator Principles, there is increased "peer
and consumer pressure" for other large financial institutions to adopt
the Principles. 25 7
For example, several banks often combine
resources to fund large financial projects. In these situations, banks
in the syndicate with lower standards could compromise the
standards for assessing and monitoring the environmental and social
risks. 258 Therefore, EPFIs have a large incentive to ensure that other
banks in the syndicate who have not adopted the Equator Principles
nevertheless adhere to the same required level of environmental
scrutiny. 259
Moreover, smaller local banks in developing nations
frequently are involved in the funding of projects in their local
communities and are also subject to the same pressure by the EPFIs
to adhere to the Principles. 26 0 This influence has the added benefit of
creating a conduit to transfer the knowledge of international financial
institutions to local ones, helping them identify and monitor
environmental concerns in the future. 261 Thus, as the Equator
Principles gain in popularity, it will become increasingly difficult not
to adopt the Principles or other equivalent environmental guidelines.
There also have been several unforeseen advantages to the
First, as a result of the enhanced risk
Equator Principles.
management policies stemming from the adoption of the Equator
Principles, many banks are making a commitment above and beyond

255.
Id.; see also CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 2004, supra note 118, at 33.
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256.
257.
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258.
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the guidelines. For example, Wells Fargo is considering extending
the Principles to its corporate lending and private equity-investment
businesses. 262 HSBC is now weighing the introduction of principles
similar to the Equator Principles to govern its corporate
underwriting, which traditionally would fall outside the scope of the
Equator Principles. 26 3 And JP Morgan Chase has established "No Go
Zones" whereby it refuses to fund commercial logging projects that
pose a risk of environmental degradation. 264 Second, the Equator
Principles are having an influential upstream impact. Instead of
companies being deterred from lending through an EPFI because of
their increased protocols, "companies are asking how to become
26 5
compliant [with the Principles] so their projects will be eligible."
These positive signs give hope to the supporters of the Equator
Principles.
However, there are unforeseen negative impacts resulting from
the adoption of the Equator Principles as well. For example, the
Equator Principles have unified the EPFIs, thus creating a new
lobbying group. Since the Equator Principles are directly related to
the IFC and the World Bank, the EPFIs have a vested interest in the
activities of these institutions. 266 For example, in 2004 the World
Bank commissioned an independent study to examine the World
Bank's natural resources portfolio. 267 The results of this study,
entitled the Extractive Industries Review, recommended that the
World Bank "withdraw from lending to coal immediately and to oil by
2008. ' 268 After these recommendations were released, the EPFIs
submitted a letter to the President of World Bank, urging the World
Bank to reject the recommendations of the Extractive Industries
Review. 269 Some view this action as a positive step, i.e., gaining
increased participation from the private sector regarding
environmental concerns. 270 In contrast, many NGOs view this letter
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as private banks "lobbying against proposals that would make
emerging market investments better benefit the poor."'27 1 Whether
the new unified lobbying group will result in more economically
efficient and environmentally sound policies remains to be seen.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This Note addressed the events leading up to the adoption of the
Equator Principles, the impact of these Principles, and the future of
the Principles.
These Principles were created and adopted to
establish an international environmental standard and increase
public scrutiny of the financial sector. After three years, NGOs
continue to criticize the Principles for their failings. However, the
Principles have improved the marketplace, where the private sector
takes an active role in implementing environmental standards ahead
of government action. Moreover, although little information is known
about the actual affect of the Principles on the local environment, the
Principles have substantially impacted the banking industry. A
growing emphasis is now placed on risk management and the
creation of a uniform standard of environmental compliance, which
avoids banks being pitted against each other in a race to the bottom.
Furthermore, the adoption of the Equator Principles represents a
bank's commitment to implementing policies and incorporating
private second-order agreements into its loan transactions that are
designed to ensure that the projects it funds in the developing world
are environmentally responsible.
Even though banks probably will escape legal liability for
violations of the Principles, they will be held accountable in the court
of public opinion. By creating a uniform standard for environmental
agreements, the Equator Principles have developed a uniform public
expectation. If EPFIs fail to meet this expectation, the failure will
result in intense public criticism leading to real-world consequences,
such as an injured brand reputation and decreased investment from
socially responsible investment groups. Moreover, the EPII offer new
hope by incorporating changes that respond to criticisms of the
original Equator Principles. The revision process itself reflects a shift
in the marketplace: increased communication between the private
sector and NGOs. Even though the overall effect of the Equator
Principles remains controversial, it is clear that their impact thus far
has heightened the public's ability to influence private action and has
created a new role for the private sector to be proactive in setting

271.
Earth).

Id. (quoting Michelle Chan-Fishel, a representative from Friends of the
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environmental standards, which has led to significant gains in the
public's ability to protect the environment.
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